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Abstract	  
	  
Despite	  many	  years	  of	  research,	  there	  has	  been	  surprisingly	  little	  progress	  in	  our	  
understanding	  of	  how	  faces	  are	  identified.	  	  Here	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  two	  
contributory	  factors:	  (i)	  our	  methods	  have	  obscured	  a	  critical	  aspect	  of	  the	  
problem,	  within-­‐person	  variability;	  and	  (ii)	  research	  has	  tended	  to	  conflate	  
familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  face	  processing.	  	  Examples	  of	  procedures	  for	  studying	  
variability	  are	  given,	  and	  a	  case	  is	  made	  for	  studying	  real	  faces,	  of	  the	  type	  people	  
recognize	  every	  day.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  face	  recognition	  (specifically	  identification)	  
may	  only	  be	  understood	  by	  adopting	  new	  techniques	  which	  acknowledge	  
statistical	  patterns	  in	  the	  visual	  environment.	  	  As	  a	  consequence,	  some	  of	  our	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Face	  perception	  is	  now	  a	  popular,	  mainstream,	  focus	  for	  research	  in	  psychology.	  	  
From	  its	  roots	  in	  eye-­‐witness	  identification,	  the	  study	  of	  face	  processing	  has	  
developed	  to	  cover	  a	  very	  wide	  range	  of	  topics,	  from	  social	  interaction	  to	  neural	  
implementation.	  	  Much	  progress	  has	  been	  made:	  for	  example	  a	  great	  deal	  is	  now	  
known	  about	  the	  perception	  of	  emotion,	  gaze	  and	  attractiveness.	  	  However,	  
despite	  the	  volume	  of	  this	  research,	  there	  has	  been	  surprisingly	  little	  progress	  
towards	  understanding	  identification;	  this	  key	  aspect	  of	  face	  recognition	  appears	  
to	  have	  resisted	  incremental	  solution.	  	  Since	  there	  is	  both	  a	  theoretical	  and	  a	  
practical	  imperative	  to	  understand	  identification,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  failure	  of	  
research	  effort	  within	  psychology.	  	  	  
	  
In	  this	  article,	  I	  will	  suggest	  reasons	  for	  our	  lack	  of	  progress.	  	  I	  will	  make	  the	  
following	  arguments.	  	  1.	  	  Experimental	  methods	  have	  become	  popular	  which	  
direct	  us	  away	  from	  studying	  perception	  of	  real	  faces.	  The	  use	  of	  artificial	  or	  
tightly	  controlled	  stimuli	  not	  only	  limits	  the	  generalisablity	  of	  results,	  but	  may	  
actually	  undermine	  a	  theoretical	  understanding	  of	  the	  problem.	  	  As	  a	  
consequence	  the	  field	  has	  come	  to	  rely	  on	  poorly-­‐specified	  notions,	  such	  as	  
‘configural	  processing’,	  which	  have	  hindered	  rather	  than	  helped.	  2.	  A	  proper	  
analysis	  of	  face	  recognition	  requires	  a	  theoretical	  understanding	  of	  the	  
differences	  between	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  face	  processing.	  Failure	  to	  draw	  this	  
distinction	  properly	  has	  also	  restricted	  progress	  in	  the	  field.	  	  3.	  A	  key	  part	  of	  
familiar	  face	  recognition	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  any	  particular	  face	  may	  
vary.	  	  Different	  pictures	  of	  the	  same	  face	  are	  highly	  variable,	  and	  we	  cannot	  
understand	  how	  to	  recognize	  someone	  without	  an	  understanding	  of	  that	  
variance.	  	  
	  
A	  theme	  running	  through	  the	  paper	  will	  be	  the	  necessity	  properly	  to	  analyse	  the	  
task	  of	  face	  recognition.	  	  Bruce	  and	  Young’s	  (1986)	  well-­‐known	  paper	  on	  this	  
topic	  remains	  influential	  many	  years	  after	  it	  was	  published	  because	  it	  provides	  a	  
thorough	  analysis	  of	  the	  tasks	  involved	  in	  different	  aspects	  of	  face	  processing	  
(see	  Young	  &	  Bruce,	  2011	  for	  a	  modern	  reflection	  on	  this).	  	  However,	  as	  the	  field	  
has	  widened,	  theoretical	  coherence	  has	  sometimes	  been	  hard	  to	  maintain.	  	  The	  
study	  of	  particular	  laboratory-­‐based	  phenomena	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	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studying	  face	  recognition	  itself,	  and	  researchers	  have	  sometimes	  been	  guilty	  of	  
following	  chains	  of	  experimental	  reasoning,	  without	  serious	  reflection	  on	  how	  
these	  relate	  to	  our	  remarkable	  ability	  to	  recognize	  one	  another	  in	  daily	  life.	  	  
	  
I	  will	  start	  this	  analysis	  with	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  stimuli	  we	  use	  in	  our	  
research.	  	  However,	  before	  doing	  so,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  
arguments	  below	  are	  not	  aimed	  at	  any	  specific	  researcher	  or	  research	  groups.	  
Much	  of	  what	  follows	  is	  critical	  of	  methods	  used	  in	  face	  recognition	  research,	  and	  
in	  almost	  every	  case	  my	  own	  research	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  these	  criticisms.	  	  
However,	  it	  seems	  undeniable	  that	  progress	  in	  understanding	  recognition	  has	  
been	  disappointingly	  slow,	  and	  the	  following	  analysis	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  unpack	  the	  
reasons	  for	  this.	  	  
	  
	  
Face	  recognition	  research	  using	  the	  faces	  people	  recognise	  	  
	  
A	  lay	  person	  visiting	  a	  face	  research	  lab	  might	  be	  surprised	  to	  see	  the	  types	  of	  
images	  used	  in	  our	  experiments.	  	  That	  person	  can	  recognize	  Paul	  McCartney	  or	  
Meryl	  Streep	  across	  a	  huge	  range	  of	  different	  conditions,	  as	  an	  internet	  search	  
will	  demonstrate	  instantly.	  	  And	  yet	  the	  images	  we	  find	  in	  many	  experiments	  are	  
much	  more	  tightly	  constrained	  than	  this.	  	  In	  many	  research	  projects	  photographs	  
of	  unfamiliar	  people	  are	  taken	  in	  highly	  controlled	  conditions,	  specifically	  for	  the	  
experiments	  planned.	  Images	  are	  typically	  captured	  with	  the	  same	  camera,	  
under	  constant	  (or	  systematically	  varied)	  lighting	  conditions,	  in	  the	  same	  (or	  
systematically	  varied)	  pose,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  We	  often	  crop	  face	  images	  of	  their	  hair	  
and	  perhaps	  normalize	  them	  for	  whatever	  low-­‐level	  image	  characteristics	  we	  
think	  important	  at	  the	  time.	  In	  short,	  we	  attempt	  to	  control	  for	  all	  noise,	  and	  to	  
eliminate	  variance	  in	  all	  dimensions	  except	  those	  we	  wish	  to	  manipulate.	  	  In	  this	  
section	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  choice	  of	  experimental	  stimuli	  has	  sometimes	  misled	  us.	  
Through	  a	  well-­‐intentioned	  effort	  to	  eliminate	  spurious	  variability	  in	  our	  stimuli,	  
we	  have	  often	  asked	  the	  wrong	  question	  of	  our	  experimental	  participants.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  1	  HERE	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The	  first	  point	  to	  make	  is	  that	  it	  is	  almost	  never	  appropriate	  to	  conflate	  face	  
recognition	  with	  image	  recognition.	  	  	  Figure	  1	  shows	  two	  different	  matching	  
tasks,	  one	  is	  trivially	  easy,	  the	  other	  is	  hard.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  surprising	  that	  after	  so	  
many	  years	  of	  research	  in	  this	  field,	  this	  conflation	  continues.	  Figure	  1	  presents	  
the	  problem	  in	  a	  starker	  way	  than	  normal,	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  same-­‐photo	  
recognition	  is	  usually	  buried	  in	  experimental	  procedure,	  perhaps	  as	  an	  item	  to	  
be	  remembered,	  or	  to	  be	  recognized	  among	  distractors.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  always	  
easier	  to	  recognize	  a	  picture	  than	  to	  recognize	  a	  face,	  and	  treating	  face	  
recognition	  as	  a	  special	  case	  of	  image	  recognition	  will	  deliver	  the	  wrong	  answer.	  
In	  fact,	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  unfamiliar	  face	  recognition	  is	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  
image-­‐level	  characteristics	  (Hancock,	  Bruce,	  &	  Burton,	  2000;	  Megreya	  &	  Burton,	  
2006).	  	  When	  confronted	  with	  two	  images	  of	  the	  same	  unfamiliar	  person,	  one	  
does	  not	  recruit	  face-­‐related	  processing,	  but	  instead	  relies	  on	  unsophisticated	  
image-­‐comparison	  techniques,	  which	  might	  be	  used	  for	  any	  pattern.	  To	  this	  
extent,	  one’s	  success	  in	  matching	  two	  photos	  of	  the	  same	  face	  relies	  on	  how	  
similar	  are	  the	  images	  of	  that	  face	  –	  and	  of	  course	  they	  are	  maximally	  similar	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  identical	  photos.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  2	  HERE	  
	  
Although	  many	  researchers	  do	  try	  to	  avoid	  conflating	  image	  and	  face	  
recognition,	  it	  is	  not	  straightforward	  to	  know	  what	  to	  do	  about	  this.	  	  One	  
common	  response	  is	  to	  use	  different	  photos	  of	  the	  same	  people	  taken	  in	  the	  
same	  photographic	  session,	  and	  with	  the	  same	  camera,	  but	  with	  a	  change	  of	  pose.	  
Good	  examples	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  Benton	  Test	  (Benton	  et	  al,	  1994)	  and	  the	  
Cambridge	  Face	  Memory	  Test	  (Duchaine	  &	  Nakayama,	  2006).	  	  However,	  the	  
effect	  of	  a	  camera	  on	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  face	  is	  actually	  rather	  great,	  as	  are	  
superficial	  differences	  in	  presentation.	  	  If	  one	  is	  to	  use	  image-­‐matching	  as	  a	  
strategy	  to	  compare	  unfamiliar	  faces,	  then	  images	  taken	  with	  the	  same	  camera,	  
using	  the	  same	  shutter	  and	  lens	  settings,	  will	  by	  definition	  share	  much	  in	  
common.	  	  To	  illustrate,	  figure	  2	  shows	  different	  images	  of	  the	  same	  person.	  	  A	  
and	  B	  are	  different	  images	  with	  the	  same	  camera.	  	  C	  and	  D	  match	  these	  poses	  but	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with	  a	  different	  camera,	  and	  with	  a	  minor	  change	  in	  presentation:	  the	  subject	  has	  
let	  her	  hair	  down.	  All	  the	  photos	  were	  taken	  within	  minutes	  of	  each	  other.	  	  It	  is	  
clear	  that	  a	  within-­‐camera,	  same-­‐hair-­‐state	  match	  is	  much	  simpler	  than	  a	  
between	  camera	  match.	  However,	  these	  superficial	  differences	  are	  completely	  
transparent	  to	  familiar	  viewers.	  So,	  evidence	  from	  studies	  using	  highly	  similar	  
images	  cannot	  simply	  be	  extended	  to	  face	  recognition	  in	  general.	  	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  3	  HERE	  
	  
Differences	  in	  camera	  characteristics	  are	  well-­‐known	  to	  photographers.	  To	  
illustrate	  just	  one	  important	  dimension,	  figure	  3	  (after	  Harper	  &	  Latto,	  2001)	  
shows	  the	  effect	  of	  manipulating	  a	  single	  variable,	  within	  a	  camera:	  focal	  length.	  	  
Images	  of	  the	  same	  person,	  taken	  within	  the	  same	  session,	  look	  rather	  different,	  
simply	  through	  having	  been	  taken	  from	  different	  distances.	  	  These	  differences	  
should	  remind	  us	  that	  trying	  to	  capture	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  face	  by	  taking	  
measurements	  in	  the	  picture	  plane	  are	  doomed	  to	  failure	  –	  because	  such	  
measurements	  change	  under	  commonplace	  changes	  in	  the	  capture	  situation.	  	  A	  
simple	  photographic	  variable,	  distance	  between	  subject	  and	  camera,	  is	  enough	  to	  
make	  severe	  changes	  to	  images,	  and	  this	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  
unfamiliar	  face	  matching.	  	  Such	  differences	  are,	  of	  course,	  much	  larger	  over	  
changes	  in	  camera,	  and	  entirely	  missed	  if	  one	  restricts	  oneself	  to	  photos	  taken	  
under	  tightly	  controlled	  conditions.	  The	  danger	  is	  that	  these	  experimental	  
restrictions	  obscure	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  face	  recognition.	  	  
	  
In	  fact,	  the	  problem	  of	  constrained	  stimuli	  is	  often	  more	  severe	  than	  use	  of	  a	  
database	  of	  experimental	  images.	  	  It	  has	  become	  quite	  common	  in	  the	  literature	  
to	  edit	  photos	  or	  even	  use	  artificial	  stimuli,	  with	  an	  assumption	  that	  perception	  
of	  the	  resulting	  images	  is	  the	  same	  as	  perception	  of	  faces.	  	  One	  example	  can	  be	  
seen	  in	  research	  comparing	  the	  recognition	  of	  identity	  and	  sex.	  	  It	  is	  well-­‐
established,	  across	  a	  large	  number	  of	  different	  studies,	  that	  people	  are	  highly	  
accurate	  and	  very	  fast	  at	  judging	  the	  sex	  of	  a	  face.	  	  A	  judgement	  of	  familiarity	  is	  
typically	  longer.	  	  (Values	  vary	  according	  to	  stimuli	  and	  experimental	  conditions,	  
but	  RTs	  of	  600ms	  and	  800ms	  respectively	  are	  typical	  of	  early	  work	  –	  e.g.	  Ellis	  et	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al,	  1990).	  	  Using	  logic	  typical	  of	  this	  field,	  Bruce	  et	  al	  (1987)	  asked	  whether	  these	  
two	  judgements	  might	  lie	  in	  series	  or	  in	  parallel.	  	  They	  showed	  participants	  
famous	  male	  faces	  which	  had	  been	  judged	  androgynous	  or	  highly	  masculine	  by	  a	  
separate	  group	  of	  viewers.	  	  Bruce	  et	  al	  found	  that	  androgynous	  faces	  took	  longer	  
to	  judge	  as	  male,	  but	  that	  this	  had	  no	  knock-­‐on	  effect	  to	  judgements	  of	  identity,	  
giving	  strong	  evidence	  for	  an	  independent,	  rather	  than	  sequential,	  arrangement	  
of	  the	  two	  processes.	  	  
	  
This	  independence	  of	  gender	  and	  identity	  perception	  has	  been	  challenged	  in	  the	  
literature,	  but	  interestingly,	  it	  has	  always	  been	  challenged	  using	  stimuli	  
deliberately	  edited	  to	  remove	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  face.	  	  For	  example,	  Goshen-­‐
Gottstein	  &	  Ganel,	  (2000)	  demonstrated	  priming	  onto	  a	  sex	  judgement	  –	  an	  
effect	  which	  had	  not	  previously	  been	  reported	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  Furthermore,	  
the	  pattern	  of	  priming	  did	  suggest	  an	  association	  with	  identity	  processing,	  in	  
contrast	  to	  the	  Bruce	  et	  al	  study.	  	  However,	  these	  patterns	  existed	  only	  	  when	  the	  
faces	  were	  severely	  cropped,	  to	  strip	  away	  all	  hair	  and	  face-­‐outline;	  results	  for	  
intact	  faces	  were	  consistent	  with	  the	  earlier	  ‘independent	  route’	  theories.	  
Despite	  this,	  the	  results	  were	  taken	  to	  imply	  “evidence	  for	  a	  common	  route	  for	  
the	  processing	  of	  sex	  and	  identity”	  	  -­‐	  the	  sub-­‐title	  of	  Goshen-­‐Gottstein	  &	  Ganel’s	  
paper.	  	  In	  similar	  vein,	  (Rossion,	  2002)	  used	  morphs	  of	  faces	  with	  no	  hair	  or	  
external	  features,	  and	  showed	  that	  photos	  of	  experimentally	  familiarized	  stimuli	  
(called	  ‘familiar’	  here),	  gave	  rise	  to	  faster	  sex	  judgements	  than	  novel	  hair-­‐less	  
outline-­‐less	  faces.	  	  Once	  again,	  the	  conclusion	  drawn	  is	  that	  gender	  and	  identity	  
processing	  are	  not	  independent.	  	  
	  
What	  do	  we	  learn	  from	  such	  studies?	  	  My	  contention	  here	  is	  that	  one	  should	  not	  
generalize	  experimental	  results	  from	  highly	  artificial	  stimuli.	  	  Both	  these	  papers	  
are	  interesting	  methodologically,	  and	  both,	  very	  helpfully,	  provide	  examples	  of	  
their	  stimuli.	  	  However,	  in	  both	  cases,	  conclusions	  are	  drawn	  about	  our	  normal	  
face	  recognition	  system	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  images	  which	  deliberately	  exclude	  some	  
features	  of	  faces.	  	  The	  most	  that	  can	  be	  claimed	  in	  such	  circumstances,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  
possible	  to	  edit	  faces	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  particular	  pattern	  of	  
effect.	  	  However,	  such	  demonstrations	  do	  not	  speak	  to	  claims	  based	  on	  face	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recognition	  in	  general	  (e.g.	  Ellis	  et	  al,	  1990)	  deriving	  from	  experiments	  using	  full	  
images	  of	  faces.	  	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  has	  become	  so	  common	  to	  use	  artificial	  or	  highly	  
edited	  faces,	  that	  acknowledgement	  of	  this	  is	  often	  omitted	  from	  published	  titles	  
or	  abstracts.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  it	  is	  sometimes	  appropriate	  to	  use	  
graphically	  manipulated	  stimuli,	  depending	  on	  the	  question	  being	  asked;	  but	  this	  
is	  such	  an	  important	  experimental	  decision	  that	  readers	  might	  reasonably	  expect	  
to	  see	  it	  clearly	  flagged	  in	  any	  précis	  of	  the	  research.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  4	  HERE	  
	  
Another	  extreme	  example	  of	  using	  manipulated	  images	  arises	  when	  researchers	  
employ	  artificial	  stimuli,	  which	  can	  be	  manipulated	  in	  computer	  graphics	  to	  have	  
exactly	  the	  characteristics	  required.	  	  Good	  examples	  are	  stimuli	  in	  important	  and	  
influential	  papers	  by	  Loffler,	  Yourganov,	  Wilkinson,	  &	  Wilson,	  (2005)	  and	  
Leopold,	  O'Toole,	  Vetter,	  &	  Blanz,	  (2001).	  Figure	  4	  shows	  illustrations	  from	  these	  
papers,	  providing	  examples	  of	  the	  artificial	  stimuli	  used	  in	  each.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  
faces	  vary	  within	  a	  ‘face	  space’:	  dimensions	  are	  derived	  from	  a	  statistical	  analysis	  
of	  examples,	  or	  in	  some	  cases	  from	  first	  principles,	  and	  individual	  people’s	  faces	  
are	  defined	  as	  having	  values	  on	  each	  of	  these	  dimensions.	  	  While	  such	  a	  
characterization	  is	  useful	  for	  some	  purposes,	  it	  is	  severely	  restricted	  in	  others.	  
Under	  these	  notions,	  faces	  have	  a	  singleton	  point	  representing	  their	  ‘true’	  value.	  	  
Any	  movement	  through	  space	  must	  represent	  a	  move	  to	  another	  identity,	  or	  to	  a	  
less	  accurate	  representation	  of	  that	  person,	  for	  example,	  a	  neighbourhood	  of	  
‘error’	  might	  be	  defined.	  	  
	  
Why	  object	  to	  the	  use	  of	  such	  stimuli?	  One	  simplistic	  complaint	  is	  that	  they	  may	  
reduce	  the	  generalisablity	  of	  experimental	  results.	  	  Real	  faces	  do	  vary,	  and	  
studying	  artificially	  derived	  faces	  in	  these	  examples	  is,	  in	  fact,	  another	  example	  
of	  confounding	  a	  single	  image	  with	  a	  face.	  There	  is	  no	  single	  image	  which	  truly	  
represents	  any	  real	  person.	  A	  counter-­‐example	  might	  be	  the	  Mona	  Lisa,	  but	  the	  
contention	  here	  is	  that	  understanding	  recognition	  of	  the	  Mona	  Lisa	  does	  not	  
make	  a	  good	  model	  for	  understanding	  recognition	  of	  Hillary	  Clinton.	  	  However,	  
there	  is	  a	  potentially	  more	  serious	  problem	  which	  can	  arise.	  	  These	  stimuli	  can	  
	   9	  
give	  false	  prominence	  to	  characteristics	  of	  faces	  which	  are	  important	  for	  
restricted	  sets,	  but	  not	  for	  the	  world.	  	  To	  illustrate	  this,	  I	  will	  consider	  this	  issue	  
of	  ‘configural	  processing’	  in	  face	  recognition.	  	  	  	  
	  
Configural	  processing	  is	  a	  theoretical	  concept	  which	  is	  very	  often	  recruited	  in	  the	  
face	  recognition	  literature,	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  normally	  poorly	  defined.	  	  A	  clear	  
statement	  is	  given	  by	  Tanaka	  &	  Gordon	  (2011):	  ‘	  We	  use	  the	  term	  “configural	  
processing”	  …	  to	  refer	  to	  encoding	  of	  metric	  distances	  between	  features	  (i.e.	  
second-­‐order	  relational	  properties)”.	  	  	  So,	  the	  proposal	  is	  that	  we	  can	  
differentiate	  between	  the	  people	  we	  know,	  because	  they	  have	  a	  characteristic	  set	  
of	  relations	  between	  the	  metric	  distances	  within	  their	  faces.	  	  
One	  significant	  problem	  with	  this	  notion	  is	  that	  it	  is	  never	  operationalized.	  	  How	  
do	  we	  know	  which	  distances	  to	  measure?	  	  What	  are	  the	  key	  distances	  (or	  
relations	  between	  these)	  which	  allow	  us	  to	  recognise	  Hillary	  Clinton	  in	  
thousands	  of	  pictures	  of	  her?	  	  No-­‐one	  has	  come	  close	  to	  providing	  a	  working	  
definition	  which	  allows	  this,	  and	  computer-­‐based	  attempts	  to	  recognize	  people	  
in	  this	  way	  have	  a	  thirty-­‐year	  history	  of	  failure.	  	  Furthermore,	  attempts	  to	  
operationalize	  this	  notion	  in	  forensic	  contexts	  has	  not	  worked	  (Kleinberg,	  
Vanezis,	  &	  Burton,	  2007).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  key	  set	  of	  relations	  between	  
measurements	  uniquely	  characterizing	  a	  face	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  discovered,	  but	  the	  
evidence	  that	  this	  will	  eventually	  produce	  reliable	  results	  is	  not	  good.	  	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  5	  HERE	  
	  
In	  fact,	  there	  are	  two	  good	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  configural	  processing,	  defined	  
in	  this	  way,	  probably	  does	  not	  underlie	  our	  perception	  of	  identity.	  	  The	  first	  is	  
that	  ‘metric	  distances	  between	  features’	  is	  not	  stable	  across	  different	  photos	  of	  
the	  same	  person.	  	  This	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figures	  2,	  3	  and	  5.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  Figure	  
3,	  the	  face	  has	  different	  configurations	  according	  to	  how	  the	  photograph	  was	  
taken,	  in	  this	  case	  distance	  from	  the	  subject.	  	  Such	  differences	  are	  completely	  
unnoticed	  in	  images	  of	  familiar	  faces	  (fig	  5),	  but	  undermine	  attempts	  to	  use	  
metric	  distances	  computationally	  in	  any	  straightforward	  manner.	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The	  second	  reason	  to	  be	  wary	  of	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  configural	  processing	  
is	  that	  familiar	  face	  recognition	  is	  not	  damaged	  at	  all	  by	  image	  distortions	  which	  
severely	  affect	  configuration.	  	  The	  important	  work	  of	  Hole	  (Hole,	  George,	  Eaves,	  
&	  Rasek,	  2002)	  	  shows	  that	  familiar	  faces	  may	  be	  stretched	  up	  to	  twice	  their	  
original	  height	  with	  no	  effect	  on	  subjects’	  ability	  (or	  speed)	  to	  recognise	  them.	  
While	  this	  is	  a	  severe	  distortion,	  affecting	  all	  distances,	  ratios	  and	  angles	  in	  the	  
face	  except	  simple	  1d	  measures,	  it	  appears	  that	  our	  face	  recognition	  system	  is	  
blind	  to	  such	  severe	  configural	  changes.	  	  Further	  support	  for	  this	  finding	  is	  found	  
in	  studies	  of	  the	  ERP	  component	  N250r,	  which	  is	  sensitive	  to	  repetitions	  of	  
familiar	  faces.	  The	  component	  is	  affected	  maximally	  by	  repetitions	  of	  the	  same	  
image	  of	  a	  face,	  allowing	  one	  to	  ask,	  what	  counts	  as	  ‘same	  image’	  for	  this	  
purpose.	  Bindemann,	  Burton,	  Leuthold,	  &	  Schweinberger,	  (2008)	  showed	  that	  
repeating	  images	  in	  which	  one	  is	  a	  stretched	  version	  of	  the	  other	  elicits	  the	  same	  
N250r	  response	  as	  repeating	  the	  identical	  image	  –	  i.e.	  whatever	  function	  is	  being	  
observed	  by	  this	  technique	  appears	  robust	  to	  quite	  severe	  geometric	  distortions.	  	  
	  
My	  proposal	  here	  is	  simple:	  if	  we	  had	  taken	  as	  our	  starting-­‐point,	  the	  images	  of	  
faces	  which	  people	  recognize	  every	  day,	  from	  newspapers,	  the	  internet	  or	  TV,	  
then	  we	  would	  almost	  certainly	  not	  have	  gained	  the	  impression	  that	  what	  
differentiates	  our	  faces	  is	  a	  pattern	  of	  2d	  measurements	  in	  the	  picture	  plane.	  	  It	  
would	  be	  hard	  to	  hold	  that	  position,	  given	  normal	  exposure	  to	  images,	  because	  it	  
is	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  as	  much	  variability	  within	  individuals	  as	  there	  is	  between	  
them.	  In	  fact,	  the	  position	  is	  only	  tenable	  if	  one	  deliberately	  excludes	  much	  of	  the	  
variability	  found	  in	  everyday	  images	  of	  faces.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  current	  theories	  give	  
us	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  how	  to	  discriminate	  two	  specific	  pictures,	  but	  not	  
how	  to	  discriminate	  between	  real	  faces,	  with	  all	  their	  complex	  variability.	  	  In	  a	  
later	  section,	  I	  will	  develop	  this	  idea	  further,	  arguing	  that	  variability	  itself	  should	  
be	  the	  focus	  of	  future	  research.	  	  
	  
Although	  I	  have	  used	  configural	  processing	  as	  an	  example,	  the	  point	  is	  more	  
general:	  a	  well-­‐motivated	  desire	  to	  use	  properly	  controlled	  images,	  free	  from	  
inconvenient	  noise,	  can	  nevertheless	  obscure	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  problem	  one	  
wishes	  to	  study.	  	  In	  general,	  the	  choice	  of	  experimental	  stimuli	  will	  certainly	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constrain	  one’s	  thinking	  about	  any	  problem.	  In	  this	  particular	  case,	  I	  have	  argued	  
that	  it	  may	  actually	  guide	  one’s	  theorizing	  away	  from	  an	  understanding	  of	  face	  
perception.	  	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  turn	  to	  a	  different	  problem:	  the	  important	  issue	  
of	  familiarity.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Differences	  between	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  face	  recognition	  
	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  qualitative	  differences	  between	  
perception	  of	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  faces,	  and	  that	  a	  failure	  to	  incorporate	  this	  
into	  modern	  theories	  has	  further	  contributed	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  in	  face	  
recognition.	  	  In	  previous	  work,	  we	  have	  suggested	  that	  unfamiliar	  faces	  are	  
perceived,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  identity,	  simply	  as	  patterns	  –	  visual	  images	  with	  no	  
privileged	  (‘special’)	  method	  of	  processing	  (Hancock	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Burton	  &	  
Jenkins,	  2011).	  	  Based	  on	  evidence	  presented	  in	  a	  paper	  provocatively	  titled	  
‘Unfamiliar	  faces	  are	  not	  faces’	  (Megreya	  &	  Burton,	  2006),	  we	  argued	  that	  the	  
processing	  of	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  faces	  dissociate,	  to	  some	  extent.	  	  If	  this	  
claim	  is	  true,	  then	  it	  is	  important,	  because	  almost	  all	  contemporary	  theories	  of	  
face	  recognition	  fail	  to	  distinguish	  between	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  stimuli,	  
instead	  treating	  faces	  as	  a	  unitary	  class	  to	  be	  compared	  with	  other	  objects	  of	  
visual	  recognition.	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  known	  for	  many	  years	  that	  recognition	  memory	  tests	  show	  an	  
advantage	  for	  familiar	  over	  unfamiliar	  faces,	  both	  in	  accuracy	  and	  in	  speed	  (e.g.	  
Bruce,	  1986;	  Ellis	  et	  al,	  1979;	  Klatzky	  &	  Forrest,	  1984).	  	  	  Furthermore,	  changes	  in	  
expression,	  lighting	  and	  viewpoint	  have	  all	  been	  shown	  to	  damage	  recognition	  
memory	  for	  unfamiliar	  faces	  more	  than	  for	  familiar	  faces	  (e.g.	  Patterson	  &	  
Baddeley,	  1977;	  Hill	  &	  Bruce,	  1996;	  O’Toole	  et	  al,	  1998;	  Roberts	  &	  Bruce	  1989).	  	  
These	  results	  consistently	  demonstrate	  a	  superiority	  for	  familiar	  faces	  in	  
memory,	  but	  do	  not	  in	  themselves	  indicate	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  
familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  faces.	  	  However,	  more	  recent	  studies	  using	  matching	  
rather	  than	  memory,	  provide	  stronger	  evidence.	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FIGURE	  6	  HERE	  
	  
In	  a	  series	  of	  experiments,	  Bruce	  et	  al	  (1999,	  2001)	  set	  out	  to	  establish	  a	  baseline	  
for	  unfamiliar	  face	  recognition,	  uncontaminated	  by	  fallible	  memory.	  	  Participants	  
were	  shown	  1-­‐in-­‐10	  line-­‐ups	  (see	  figure	  6),	  in	  which	  the	  target	  face	  (top)	  may	  or	  
may	  not	  be	  present	  in	  the	  array	  of	  ten	  possible	  matches.	  	  All	  faces	  were	  young	  
men,	  Caucasian,	  short-­‐haired	  and	  clean-­‐shaven.	  Surprisingly,	  at	  the	  time,	  	  
viewers	  performed	  this	  task	  poorly.	  	  Despite	  unlimited	  time	  to	  study	  the	  faces,	  
and	  simultaneously	  present	  target	  and	  arrays,	  subjects	  typically	  achieved	  only	  
70%	  accuracy	  –	  for	  both	  target-­‐present	  and	  target-­‐absent	  arrays.	  	  This	  finding	  
has	  been	  replicated	  many	  times,	  using	  these	  and	  other	  stimuli	  (e.g.	  Megreya	  &	  
Burton,	  2006,	  2008).	  	  Recent	  studies	  have	  tended	  to	  use	  simple	  pair-­‐wise	  
matching.	  	  Two	  faces	  are	  presented	  simultaneously,	  and	  subjects	  respond	  that	  
the	  photos	  show	  the	  same	  or	  different	  people.	  	  	  Again,	  viewers	  are	  surprisingly	  
poor	  at	  this	  task	  –	  making	  20%	  errors	  on	  a	  typical	  test	  (Megreya	  &	  Burton,	  2007;	  
Burton,	  White,	  &	  McNeill,	  2010).	  This	  difficulty	  matching	  unfamiliar	  faces	  is	  not	  
restricted	  to	  photographs.	  There	  have	  now	  been	  a	  number	  of	  experimental	  
demonstrations	  that	  viewers	  are	  similarly	  poor	  at	  matching	  a	  live	  person	  to	  their	  
photo	  (Davis	  &	  Valentine,	  2009;	  Kemp,	  Towell,	  &	  Pike,	  1997;	  Megreya	  &	  Burton,	  
2008).	  	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  unfamiliar	  faces,	  people	  are	  very	  good	  indeed	  at	  recognizing	  
familiar	  people.	  	  For	  example,	  Burton,	  Wilson,	  Cowan,	  &	  Bruce,	  (1999)	  showed	  
real	  CCTV	  images,	  of	  low	  resolution,	  to	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  viewers.	  	  The	  
unfamiliar	  viewers	  were	  very	  bad	  at	  identification,	  performing	  almost	  at	  chance	  
level.	  	  However,	  familiar	  viewers	  performed	  almost	  perfectly	  with	  the	  same	  
images.	  	  Interestingly,	  a	  group	  of	  police	  officers,	  specialising	  in	  identification,	  
performed	  no	  better	  than	  the	  unfamiliar	  group	  –	  despite	  reporting	  significantly	  
greater	  confidence	  in	  their	  (very	  poor)	  performance.	  In	  general,	  we	  are	  excellent	  
at	  recognizing	  familiar	  faces,	  across	  a	  very	  wide	  range	  of	  settings,	  and	  even	  in	  
difficult	  viewing	  conditions.	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Given	  the	  large	  overall	  performance	  differences	  between	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  
faces,	  how	  might	  we	  established	  whether	  there	  are	  qualitative	  processing	  
differences?	  One	  approach	  is	  to	  use	  correlational	  studies	  –	  a	  technique	  which	  has	  
recently	  begun	  to	  be	  exploited	  in	  the	  literature	  (DeGutis,	  Wilmer,	  Mercado,	  &	  
Cohan,	  2013;	  Wang,	  Li,	  Fang,	  Tian,	  &	  Liu,	  2012).	  	  While	  performance	  with	  
unfamiliar	  faces	  is	  poor	  on	  average,	  there	  are	  actually	  very	  large	  individual	  
differences	  in	  the	  population	  (Burton	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Megreya	  &	  Burton,	  2006;	  	  
Russell,	  Duchaine,	  &	  Nakayama,	  2009).	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  possible,	  in	  principle,	  to	  
ask	  whether	  these	  performance	  differences	  correlate	  with	  differential	  abilities	  to	  
recognise	  familiar	  faces.	  	  In	  practice,	  this	  is	  not	  straightforward,	  because	  viewers’	  
high	  levels	  of	  performance	  with	  familiar	  faces	  restrict	  variability	  on	  that	  task.	  	  
For	  this	  reason,	  researchers	  have	  typically	  used	  familiar	  face	  tasks	  which	  are	  
contrived	  to	  be	  hard,	  and	  do	  not	  correspond	  well	  to	  the	  unfamiliar	  tasks	  with	  
which	  they	  are	  compared.	  	  Results	  are	  mixed,	  with	  some	  researchers	  showing	  no	  
association	  between	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  face	  recognition	  (Megreya	  &	  Burton,	  
2006)	  and	  others	  showing	  significant	  associations	  (Russell	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  
However,	  patterns	  of	  association	  within	  variants	  of	  the	  same	  task	  are	  
interestingly	  different	  across	  levels	  of	  familiarity.	  	  For	  unfamiliar	  faces,	  only,	  
there	  is	  a	  strong	  association	  between	  people’s	  ability	  to	  match	  faces	  when	  they	  
are	  upright	  and	  when	  they	  are	  inverted	  (Megreya	  &	  Burton,	  2006;	  Russell	  et	  al.,	  
2009).	  However,	  this	  association	  disappears	  when	  using	  familiar	  faces.	  	  
	  
To	  interpret	  this	  pattern	  of	  results,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  current	  theories	  of	  
the	  well-­‐known	  face	  inversion	  effect.	  It	  is	  often	  suggested	  that	  there	  is	  some	  face-­‐
specific	  processing	  which	  is	  engaged	  by	  upright,	  but	  not	  inverted	  faces	  (Murray,	  
Yong,	  &	  Rhodes,	  2000;	  Rossion,	  2008).	  	  Furthermore,	  inversion	  is	  sometimes	  
held	  to	  damage	  a	  viewer’s	  ability	  to	  process	  configural,	  or	  holistic	  information.	  
However,	  evidence	  for	  such	  positions	  is	  typically	  based	  on	  judgements	  made	  to	  
unfamiliar	  faces.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  basic	  phenomenon,	  demonstrated	  in	  
undergraduate	  classes	  throughout	  the	  world,	  is	  that	  we	  often	  fail	  to	  recognise	  
familiar	  faces	  when	  presented	  upside	  down.	  There	  are	  very	  significant	  
arguments	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  whether	  inversion	  has	  quantitative	  or	  
qualitative	  effects	  on	  face	  perception	  (e.g.	  Richler,	  Mack,	  Palmeri,	  &	  Gauthier,	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2011;	  Sekuler,	  Gaspar,	  Gold,	  &	  Bennett,	  2004),	  and	  almost	  all	  the	  evidence	  
recruited	  in	  this	  debate	  comes	  from	  unfamiliar	  face	  research.	  	  However,	  recent	  
evidence	  based	  on	  individual	  differences	  suggests	  an	  association	  between	  
inverted	  and	  upright	  face	  processing	  for	  unfamiliar	  but	  not	  familiar	  faces	  
(Megreya	  &	  Burton,	  2006;	  Russell	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  It	  seems	  that,	  in	  this	  case,	  a	  
tendency	  to	  conflate	  all	  faces	  together	  may	  actually	  be	  obscuring	  the	  true	  nature	  
of	  inversion	  –	  it	  is	  quite	  possible	  that	  it	  affects	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  faces	  
differently.	  	  
	  
Another	  example	  of	  the	  dissociable	  behaviour	  of	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  faces	  is	  
shown	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  mirror	  effect	  when	  matching	  unfamiliar	  faces	  
(Megreya	  &	  Burton,	  2007).	  	  Recognition	  memory	  tests	  often	  show	  a	  mirror	  
effect,	  such	  that	  the	  same	  items	  are	  easily	  recognized	  (when	  present)	  and	  easily	  
rejected	  (when	  absent).	  	  This	  effect,	  rather	  counter-­‐intuitively,	  is	  never	  observed	  
for	  unfamiliar	  faces	  –	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  faces	  we	  find	  easy	  to	  recognize	  as	  having	  
been	  present,	  are	  unrelated	  to	  those	  we	  find	  easy	  to	  reject	  as	  having	  been	  absent.	  	  
This	  has	  been	  a	  puzzle	  in	  the	  literature	  for	  some	  time	  (Deffenbacher,	  Johanson,	  
Vetter,	  &	  O'Toole,	  2000;	  Vokey	  &	  Read,	  1992).	  	  When	  originally	  demonstrated,	  
this	  finding	  was	  influential	  in	  eliminating	  the	  unidimensional	  view	  of	  facial	  
‘distinctiveness’	  which	  had	  been	  held	  to	  that	  point.	  Vokey	  &	  Read	  replaced	  this	  
with	  a	  two-­‐component	  model	  of	  distinctiveness,	  based	  on	  (i)	  memorability	  of	  a	  
face;	  and	  (ii)	  context-­‐free	  familiarity	  (i.e.	  the	  way	  certain	  faces	  appear	  familiar,	  
whether	  or	  not	  they	  are).	  	  	  In	  our	  work,	  (Megreya	  &	  Burton,	  2007)	  we	  
demonstrated	  two	  significant	  additions.	  	  First,	  a	  mirror	  effect	  is	  absent	  in	  
unfamiliar	  face	  matching,	  just	  as	  it	  is	  in	  memory	  -­‐	  a	  finding	  which	  seems	  to	  
undermine	  an	  account	  based	  on	  ‘memorablity’.	  Second,	  the	  mirror	  effect	  is	  very	  
strongly	  present	  for	  familiar	  faces	  –	  even	  those	  with	  rather	  small	  levels	  of	  
experimentally-­‐induced	  familiarity.	  	  This	  large	  discrepancy	  supports	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  
systemic	  dissociation	  between	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  faces.	  	  
	  
If	  there	  are	  qualitative	  differences	  between	  processing	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  
faces,	  then	  there	  are	  serious	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  implications.	  	  A	  failure	  to	  
differentiate	  between	  these,	  risks	  confounding	  processes	  which	  are	  particular	  to	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only	  one	  of	  the	  classes	  of	  faces,	  hence	  contributing	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  in	  
understanding	  identification.	  	  I	  will	  highlight	  two	  areas	  of	  research	  (somewhat	  
related)	  which	  are	  relevant	  here.	  	  The	  first	  is	  a	  long-­‐standing	  debate	  about	  
whether	  or	  not	  faces	  are	  ‘special’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  requiring	  dedicated	  processing	  
resources,	  distinct	  from	  those	  used	  in	  other	  object	  recognition	  tasks.	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  
debate	  which	  has	  exercised	  a	  great	  many	  people	  but	  which,	  after	  many	  years	  of	  
extensive	  research	  effort,	  has	  produced	  no	  consensus	  (Gauthier	  &	  Bukach,	  2007;	  
McKone,	  Kanwisher,	  &	  Duchaine,	  2007).	  	  One	  side	  of	  this	  debate	  holds	  that	  faces	  
are	  not	  special,	  but	  can	  appear	  to	  be	  so	  because	  people	  have	  acquired	  great	  
experience	  in	  processing	  faces	  over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  lives.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  
are	  ‘face	  experts’.	  	  However,	  researchers	  concerned	  with	  differences	  between	  
familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  faces	  find	  it	  odd	  to	  claim	  that	  people	  are	  experts	  in	  face	  
recognition.	  	  The	  extremely	  poor	  performance	  of	  viewers	  on	  apparently	  
straightforward	  matching	  tasks	  suggests	  that	  we	  are	  actually	  rather	  poor	  at	  face	  
recognition	  –	  in	  particular	  circumstances.	  	  So,	  for	  example,	  the	  Glasgow	  Face	  
Matching	  Test	  requires	  subjects	  to	  view	  two	  photos	  of	  the	  same	  or	  different	  
people,	  taken	  minutes	  apart	  in	  very	  similar	  lighting	  and	  pose,	  and	  with	  two	  high	  
quality	  cameras.	  	  Face-­‐pairs	  remain	  visible	  until	  a	  response	  is	  made,	  and	  there	  is	  
no	  time-­‐restriction.	  	  Nevertheless,	  people	  make	  20%	  errors	  in	  one	  version	  of	  the	  
task,	  and	  10%	  in	  another.	  This	  hardly	  seems	  like	  expertise.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
when	  these	  images	  are	  familiar,	  the	  task	  is	  trivial	  –	  viewers	  consistently	  score	  at	  
100%	  accuracy.	  	  	  
	  
The	  key	  to	  understanding	  this	  problem	  is	  that	  we	  are	  experts	  at	  recognizing	  
some	  faces	  –	  i.e.	  those	  we	  know.	  	  However,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  our	  ability	  to	  
match	  or	  recognize	  familiar	  faces	  does	  not	  allow	  us	  to	  generalize	  this	  
performance	  to	  unfamiliar	  faces.	  	  The	  central	  point	  is	  that	  our	  long-­‐experience	  of	  
seeing	  our	  friends	  and	  family	  allows	  us	  to	  generalize	  recognition	  of	  those	  people	  
over	  a	  very	  diverse	  range	  of	  conditions.	  	  However,	  that	  experience	  does	  not	  
allow	  us	  to	  generalize	  across	  pictures	  of	  unfamiliar	  faces	  –	  as	  can	  easily	  be	  seen	  
from	  poor	  performance	  in	  unfamiliar	  face	  matching.	  	  	  We	  might	  speculate	  that	  
this	  discrepancy	  lies	  behind	  the	  failure	  to	  discriminate	  between	  familiar	  and	  
unfamiliar	  faces	  in	  psychological	  theory.	  We	  all	  have	  the	  impression	  from	  daily	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life	  that	  face	  recognition	  is	  an	  easy	  perceptual	  task,	  when	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  only	  easy	  in	  
some	  circumstances.	  	  
	  
These	  observations	  do	  not	  speak	  to	  either	  side	  of	  the	  ‘faces	  are	  special’	  debate,	  
and	  are	  certainly	  not	  intended	  to	  support	  one	  position	  or	  the	  other.	  	  Instead,	  the	  
point	  to	  note	  is	  that	  any	  arguments	  about	  faces	  in	  general,	  are	  susceptible	  to	  the	  
problem	  that	  faces	  are	  not	  a	  single	  perceptual	  category.	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  
familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  faces	  is	  ignored	  in	  this	  debate,	  and	  so	  an	  attempt	  to	  
cohere	  the	  disparate	  evidence	  often	  involves	  a	  blending	  of	  different	  types	  of	  
effect.	  	  
	  
I	  now	  turn,	  briefly,	  to	  the	  very	  large	  literature	  on	  the	  neuroscience	  of	  face	  
processing.	  	  There	  are	  some	  well-­‐established	  phenomena	  associated	  with	  
viewing	  faces	  as	  compared	  to	  other	  objects.	  	  (This	  statement	  is	  slightly	  
contentious	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  debate	  described	  above,	  but	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
this	  part	  of	  the	  argument	  it	  is	  enough	  to	  note	  that	  there	  are	  some	  highly	  
dependable	  effects	  which	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  response	  to	  presentation	  of	  a	  face,	  
by	  comparison	  to	  most	  other	  objects.)	  	  The	  N170	  ERP	  component	  is	  modulated	  
in	  a	  characteristic	  way	  by	  faces,	  and	  this	  is	  highly	  reliable	  (e.g.	  Bentin,	  et	  al,	  1996;	  	  
see	  Eimer,	  2011	  for	  an	  overview).	  	  Furthermore,	  evidence	  from	  fMRI	  and	  MEG	  
shows	  three	  face-­‐sensitive	  cortical	  areas,	  which	  are	  commonly	  reported:	  the	  FFA,	  
OFA	  and	  STS.	  These	  observations,	  and	  careful	  experimental	  procedure,	  have	  led	  
researchers	  to	  models	  of	  face	  processing	  such	  as	  that	  proposed	  by	  Haxby	  et	  al,	  
(Haxby,	  Hoffman,	  &	  Gobbini,	  2000).	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  there	  is	  
rather	  little	  differentiation	  between	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  face	  processing	  in	  
the	  neuroscientific	  literature.	  	  
	  
In	  ERP	  research,	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  studies	  show	  no	  modulation	  of	  N170	  by	  
familiarity.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  rather	  hard	  to	  find	  any	  discrimination	  between	  these	  
classes	  of	  faces	  in	  component-­‐based	  ERP	  analysis.	  The	  most	  robust	  candidate	  to	  
date	  is	  the	  N250r	  –	  a	  component	  which	  is	  sensitive	  to	  immediate	  repetitions	  of	  
familiar,	  as	  compared	  to	  unfamiliar	  faces	  (Schweinberger,	  Huddy,	  &	  Burton,	  
2004;	  Wiese	  &	  Schweinberger,	  2008).	  In	  fMRI,	  most	  research	  is	  conducted	  with	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unfamiliar	  faces	  –	  as	  a	  way	  of	  avoiding	  activation	  of	  person-­‐specific	  knowledge	  
which	  may	  implicate	  non-­‐face	  cortical	  areas.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  relatively	  few	  
studies	  which	  have	  directly	  compared	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  faces,	  there	  is	  
rather	  little	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  any	  modulation	  at	  all,	  in	  any	  of	  the	  three	  
candidate	  brain	  regions.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  FFA,	  which	  is	  usually	  taken	  to	  process	  
identity	  (on	  the	  basis	  of	  indirect	  evidence)	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  show	  any	  great	  
sensitivity	  to	  this	  dimension.	  (See	  the	  review	  by	  Natu	  and	  O’Toole,	  2011,	  for	  
detailed	  evidence	  on	  this	  point.)	  	  For	  example,	  Davies-­‐Thompson,	  Gouws,	  &	  
Andrews,	  2009)	  used	  an	  fMR-­‐adaptation	  technique	  to	  demonstrate	  adaptation	  in	  
FFA.	  	  As	  expected,	  this	  region	  was	  sensitive	  to	  face	  images,	  but	  the	  adaptation	  
was	  tied	  to	  the	  specific	  image	  used.	  	  There	  was	  no	  adaptation	  to	  different	  images	  
of	  the	  same	  face:	  these	  exhibited	  the	  same	  response	  as	  images	  of	  different	  
people.	  Such	  demonstrations	  fail	  to	  show	  image-­‐invariant	  adaptation	  in	  FFA	  –	  
and	  hence	  show	  no	  effect	  of	  familiarity.	  	  
	  
The	  lack	  of	  a	  clear	  marker	  for	  familiarity	  in	  neuroscientific	  face	  research	  is	  
interesting.	  	  Given	  the	  large	  behavioural	  effects,	  it	  is	  somewhat	  surprising	  that	  no	  
such	  marker	  has	  been	  found.	  	  This	  might	  reflect	  the	  absence	  of	  focus	  on	  the	  issue	  
of	  familiarity	  –	  a	  conflation	  between	  classes	  of	  faces	  which	  we	  have	  already	  
noted	  in	  behavioural	  work.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  may	  reflect	  a	  more	  complex	  
mechanism	  underlying	  familiarity	  by	  comparison	  to	  other	  information	  conveyed	  
by	  faces.	  For	  example,	  Davies-­‐Thompson	  et	  al	  propose	  a	  distributed	  network	  for	  
representing	  familiarity.	  	  Whatever	  the	  solution,	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  
discrepancy	  between	  behavioural	  research	  on	  faces,	  in	  which	  the	  effects	  of	  
familiarity	  are	  very	  large,	  and	  neuroimaging	  research,	  in	  which	  these	  effects	  are	  
hard	  to	  detect	  at	  all.	  	  This	  discrepancy	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed.	  	  
	  
	  
Studying	  variability	  	  
	  
In	  an	  earlier	  section,	  I	  argued	  that	  face	  recognition	  research	  has	  ignored	  the	  
variability	  inherent	  in	  pictures	  of	  the	  same	  person.	  	  This	  omission	  has	  led	  to	  a	  
focus	  on	  what	  differentiates	  us,	  which	  is	  only	  part	  of	  the	  problem	  in	  face	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recognition.	  	  In	  fact,	  just	  as	  with	  any	  statistical	  inference,	  two	  pieces	  of	  
information	  are	  required	  to	  discriminate	  between	  samples:	  information	  about	  
the	  differences	  between,	  and	  also	  within,	  the	  samples.	  	  By	  analogy,	  current	  
methodological	  approaches	  to	  face	  recognition	  are	  like	  comparing	  two	  groups	  of	  
data	  simply	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  means,	  with	  no	  regard	  for	  their	  variances.	  	  We	  
take	  pains	  to	  explain	  to	  our	  students	  that	  a	  t-­‐test	  (say)	  compares	  differences	  
between	  group	  means	  in	  the	  context	  of	  within-­‐group	  variability,	  but	  our	  
methodological	  approach	  to	  face	  recognition	  has	  concentrated	  on	  just	  one	  of	  
these	  components.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  7	  HERE	  
	  
If	  this	  proposal	  is	  true,	  then	  we	  need	  an	  agenda	  for	  studying	  face	  recognition	  
which	  includes	  the	  missing	  component.	  In	  recent	  work,	  we	  have	  begun	  this,	  in	  
the	  first	  instance	  simply	  by	  documenting	  examples	  of	  very	  large	  within-­‐person	  
variability.	  	  For	  example,	  Jenkins	  et	  al	  (2011)	  showed	  viewers	  multiple	  photos	  of	  
foreign	  celebrities	  whom	  they	  did	  not	  know.	  	  Asked	  to	  make	  an	  attractiveness	  
judgement	  to	  each	  photo,	  it	  transpired	  that	  variability	  within	  each	  person	  
considerably	  exceeded	  variability	  between	  people.	  	  Figure	  7	  shows	  that	  some	  
celebrities	  were	  judged	  more	  attractive	  on	  average	  than	  others,	  but	  these	  
differences	  are	  much	  less	  than	  the	  differences	  within	  photos	  of	  the	  same	  person.	  	  
This	  suggests	  that	  attractiveness	  is	  just	  as	  much	  a	  property	  of	  a	  photo	  as	  it	  is	  a	  
property	  of	  a	  person.	  	  Similar	  demonstrations	  are	  possible	  with	  other	  rated	  
dimensions.	  	  For	  example,	  Jenkins	  et	  al	  also	  show	  big	  within	  person	  differences	  
on	  ratings	  of	  ‘likeness’	  for	  familiar	  faces	  (how	  good	  a	  photo	  is	  this	  of	  Bill	  
Clinton?).	  It	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  propose	  that	  such	  variability	  exists	  across	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  perceived	  facial	  dimensions.	  	  
	  
If	  we	  are	  to	  take	  seriously	  this	  injunction	  to	  study	  variability,	  then	  it	  will	  be	  
necessary	  to	  go	  beyond	  simple	  demonstrations,	  and	  provide	  operational	  
methods	  for	  quantifying	  this.	  	  I	  will	  finish	  this	  paper	  by	  describing	  briefly	  how	  
this	  might	  be	  done	  for	  (i)	  perceptual	  aspects	  of	  faces;	  and	  (ii)	  physical	  aspects	  of	  
facial	  images.	  	  	  Jenkins	  et	  al	  (2011)	  describe	  a	  technique	  for	  measuring	  one	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aspect	  of	  variability	  based	  on	  a	  sorting	  task.	  	  We	  presented	  viewers	  with	  40	  
passport-­‐sized	  photos,	  comprising	  20	  photos	  of	  two	  different	  Dutch	  celebrities.	  	  
Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  sort	  these	  into	  piles,	  one	  per	  identity,	  but	  were	  not	  
told	  how	  many	  identities	  to	  expect.	  	  The	  results	  were	  very	  clear;	  UK	  viewers	  who	  
did	  not	  know	  these	  celebrities,	  sorted	  the	  photos	  into	  many	  piles	  –	  9	  on	  average.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  almost	  all	  Dutch	  viewers	  performed	  perfectly,	  correctly	  
sorting	  the	  images	  into	  two	  piles.	  	  	  
	  
The	  effect	  of	  familiarity	  here	  is	  very	  marked,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  
difficulty	  confronted	  by	  unfamiliar	  viewers	  was	  not	  discriminating	  between	  
individuals.	  	  The	  number	  of	  piles	  containing	  two	  identities	  was	  very	  small:	  less	  
than	  one	  per	  participant	  on	  average	  across	  all	  unfamiliar	  viewers.	  	  So,	  these	  
participants	  do	  not	  have	  problems	  telling	  faces	  apart,	  they	  have	  problems	  ‘telling	  
faces	  together.’	  	  Note	  that	  the	  stimuli	  for	  these	  experiments	  were	  gathered	  from	  
an	  internet	  search.	  	  We	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  constrain	  the	  range	  of	  photos	  used,	  
except	  by	  very	  loose	  criteria	  (no	  occlusion	  of	  the	  face,	  sufficient	  resolution	  for	  
printing).	  	  Within	  these	  criteria,	  we	  used	  the	  first	  twenty	  photos	  returned	  from	  
each	  internet	  search.	  While	  we	  have	  no	  way	  to	  estimate	  how	  this	  variability	  
relates	  to	  the	  actual	  variability	  of	  all	  existing	  photos	  of	  these	  celebrities,	  it	  is	  
certainly	  the	  case	  that	  a	  wide	  range	  emerged,	  and	  that	  these	  were	  nevertheless	  
well-­‐recognised	  by	  familiar	  viewers.	  	  This	  is	  an	  easily-­‐replicable	  result,	  which	  
will	  allow	  other	  groups	  to	  witness	  the	  level	  of	  variability	  with	  their	  own	  
searches.	  	  
	  
Although	  this	  is	  research	  at	  a	  relatively	  early	  stage,	  the	  technique	  appears	  to	  give	  
an	  index	  of	  variability	  which	  is	  properly	  sensitive	  to	  familiarity.	  	  Previous	  
research	  by	  Clutterbuck	  &	  Johnston	  (2002,	  2004,	  2005)	  has	  shown	  that	  one’s	  
ability	  to	  match	  two	  different	  images	  of	  the	  same	  person	  is	  highly	  sensitive	  to	  
familiarity,	  and	  here	  a	  sorting	  task	  seems	  to	  offer	  a	  generalization	  of	  that	  result.	  	  	  
In	  future	  work,	  we	  intend	  to	  track	  performance	  on	  this	  sorting	  task	  through	  
familiarization.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  8	  HERE	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It	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  examine	  the	  variability	  of	  photos	  themselves.	  	  Some	  time	  
ago,	  we	  proposed	  a	  scheme	  for	  understanding	  face	  familiarity	  based	  on	  the	  
computation	  of	  face	  averages	  (Burton,	  Jenkins,	  Hancock,	  &	  White,	  2005).	  	  Figure	  
8	  shows	  the	  average	  of	  two	  people’s	  faces,	  constructed	  from	  a	  set	  of	  individual	  
photos.	  	  Our	  proposal	  was	  that	  averaging	  individual	  instances	  of	  faces	  forms	  a	  
good	  model	  of	  acquiring	  familiarity	  with	  a	  new	  person.	  	  As	  the	  person	  is	  
encountered	  more	  often,	  the	  sample	  on	  which	  the	  average	  is	  based	  becomes	  a	  
better	  estimate	  of	  the	  ‘population	  mean’	  for	  that	  person.	  	  In	  practice,	  this	  has	  the	  
effect	  that	  superficial	  image	  characteristics	  become	  less	  important	  in	  the	  
representation	  as	  familiarity	  increases.	  	  Figure	  8	  shows,	  for	  example,	  how	  
differences	  in	  lighting	  direction	  are	  ‘washed	  away’	  in	  the	  average	  images.	  	  
	  
We	  have	  argued	  (Burton	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Burton,	  Jenkins,	  &	  Schweinberger,	  2011)	  
that	  viewers’	  difficulties	  in	  matching	  unfamiliar	  faces	  arise	  because,	  without	  a	  
stable	  representation,	  they	  are	  forced	  into	  an	  unsophisticated	  image-­‐matching	  
strategy,	  which	  is	  inherently	  error-­‐prone.	  For	  example,	  viewers	  unfamiliar	  with	  
RJ,	  top	  half	  of	  Fig	  8,	  often	  perform	  poorly	  when	  asked	  to	  match	  two	  images	  taken	  
at	  random	  from	  the	  set	  of	  individual	  images.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  images	  
themselves	  are	  rather	  poorly	  matched	  –	  there	  are	  very	  large	  differences	  between	  
them,	  and	  these	  cause	  difficulties	  for	  the	  unfamiliar	  viewer.	  	  	  However,	  these	  
differences	  are	  eliminated	  by	  the	  average,	  which	  we	  refer	  to	  as	  a	  ‘stable’	  face	  
representation.	  	  This	  preserves	  aspects	  common	  to	  the	  sample	  (eye-­‐brows,	  
feature	  shapes	  etc),	  while	  eliminating	  variability	  in	  incidental	  dimensions	  (e.g.	  
lighting,	  expression,	  etc).	  Familiar	  viewers,	  we	  claim,	  do	  not	  find	  matching	  
difficult,	  because	  they	  are	  able	  to	  avoid	  unsophisticated	  image-­‐matching,	  and	  
instead	  compare	  individual	  photos	  to	  a	  stored	  representation.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  this	  proposal,	  based	  on	  averaging,	  is	  completely	  
consistent	  with	  a	  common	  idea	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  familiar	  vs	  unfamiliar	  face	  
processing.	  Originally	  proposed	  by	  Ellis,	  Shepherd,	  &	  Davies,	  (1979),	  it	  is	  held	  
that	  recognition	  of	  unfamiliar	  faces	  is	  based	  on	  external	  features,	  such	  as	  hair,	  to	  
a	  greater	  extent	  than	  familiar	  faces,	  where	  internal	  features	  are	  used	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comparatively	  more	  often.	  	  The	  ‘averaging’	  proposal	  is	  consistent	  with	  this	  if	  we	  
assume	  that	  external	  features	  occupy	  a	  large	  part	  of	  any	  uncropped	  image,	  and	  
so	  dominate	  a	  strategy	  based	  on	  image-­‐matching.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  these	  aspects	  
of	  the	  face	  are	  more	  variable	  than	  internal	  features;	  one’s	  hair	  changes	  more	  
often	  than	  one’s	  nose,	  say.	  This	  is	  an	  interesting	  comparison.	  	  The	  feature-­‐based	  
account	  of	  familiar	  vs	  unfamiliar	  face	  processing	  assumes	  some	  kind	  of	  
intelligent	  strategy	  for	  making	  identifications,	  based	  on	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
structure	  of	  a	  face:	  a	  general	  face	  expertise,	  perhaps.	  	  In	  contrast,	  our	  own	  
proposal	  reaches	  the	  same	  prediction	  based	  entirely	  on	  the	  statistical	  nature	  of	  
face	  images	  as	  one	  encounters	  them	  –	  it	  relies	  on	  no	  expertise	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  
faces.	  	  
	  
These	  proposals	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  automatic	  face	  recognition.	  Although	  
there	  has	  been	  steady	  progress	  in	  these	  systems,	  none	  is	  currently	  available	  with	  
useable	  levels	  of	  accuracy.	  	  O'Toole,	  An,	  Dunlop,	  &	  Natu,	  (2012)	  demonstrate	  that	  
the	  best	  available	  systems	  at	  present	  can	  achieve	  accuracy	  levels	  comparable	  to	  
unfamiliar	  viewers,	  but	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  these	  are	  far	  from	  perfect.	  	  We	  have	  
proposed	  that	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  these	  systems	  further,	  they	  should	  
incorporate	  aspects	  of	  familiar	  face	  recognition	  in	  humans	  –	  currently	  none	  do.	  	  
To	  demonstrate	  this,	  we	  have	  shown	  that	  systems	  in	  which	  novel	  images	  are	  
compared	  to	  a	  person’s	  average	  face,	  typically	  out-­‐perform	  systems	  in	  which	  two	  
separate	  instances	  are	  compared	  (Jenkins	  &	  Burton,	  2008;	  Jenkins,	  Burton,	  &	  
White,	  2006).	  	  Importantly,	  this	  effect	  appears	  to	  be	  robust	  over	  different	  
strategies	  for	  matching	  images.	  	  The	  technical	  aspects	  of	  the	  match	  algorithm	  
itself	  tends	  to	  dominate	  the	  engineering	  literature	  on	  face	  recognition.	  	  However,	  
our	  proposal	  is	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  what	  is	  to	  be	  matched	  may	  improve	  performance.	  	  
	  
So	  far,	  I	  have	  described	  the	  statistical	  approach	  to	  face	  recognition,	  using	  only	  
the	  barest	  of	  statistical	  descriptions,	  the	  mean	  of	  a	  sample	  of	  images.	  	  However,	  
the	  behavioural	  research	  described	  above	  forces	  a	  consideration	  of	  variability	  in	  
the	  face	  images	  themselves:	  it	  appears	  that	  people’s	  faces	  have	  both	  a	  
characteristic	  centroid	  and	  characteristic	  variability.	  	  How	  might	  it	  be	  possible	  to	  
quantify	  this	  variability	  in	  photos	  of	  a	  particular	  person?	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  a	  long	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tradition	  studying	  variability	  in	  face	  research,	  using	  techniques	  such	  as	  principal	  
components	  analysis	  (PCA),	  Independent	  Components	  Analysis	  (ICA)	  and	  other	  
related	  techniques	  (Bartlett,	  Movellan,	  &	  Sejnowski,	  2002;	  Kirby	  &	  Sirovich,	  
1990;	  Turk	  &	  Pentland,	  1991).	  	  However,	  the	  use	  of	  these	  techniques	  is	  almost	  
always	  aimed	  at	  discriminating	  between	  different	  faces.	  	  Large	  corpora	  of	  face	  
images	  are	  subject	  to	  these	  techniques,	  one	  image	  per	  person,	  and	  analyses	  such	  
as	  PCA	  extract	  dimensions	  of	  variability	  between	  people.	  	  More	  recently,	  we	  have	  
used	  these	  same	  techniques	  to	  examine	  the	  nature	  of	  variability	  within	  a	  person.	  
By	  subjecting	  a	  sample	  of	  images	  of	  the	  same	  person	  to	  techniques	  like	  PCA,	  it	  is	  
possible	  to	  examine	  quantitatively	  the	  dimensions	  on	  which	  that	  person	  varies.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  9	  HERE	  
	  
Details	  of	  the	  PCA	  approach	  to	  understanding	  within-­‐person	  variability	  can	  be	  
found	  elsewhere	  (Burton	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Jenkins,	  White,	  Van	  Montfort,	  &	  Burton,	  
2011).	  	  The	  approach,	  while	  in	  its	  infancy,	  appears	  promising.	  	  In	  particular,	  our	  
explorations	  appear	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  dimensions	  of	  variation	  are	  to	  some	  
extent	  shared	  between	  people:	  for	  example	  transformations	  such	  as	  pose,	  which	  
are	  common	  to	  all	  faces,	  always	  emerge	  early	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
these	  analyses	  appear	  to	  show	  idiosyncratic	  variability	  too	  –	  particularly	  as	  
manifested	  in	  non-­‐rigid	  transformational	  dimensions.	  	  	  As	  an	  example	  figure	  9	  
illustrates	  the	  first	  five	  dimensions	  which	  emerge	  from	  a	  PCA	  on	  the	  shape	  of	  
different	  pictures	  of	  Harrison	  Ford.	  Early	  components	  seem	  to	  capture	  pose;	  for	  
example,	  dimension	  1	  is	  a	  relatively	  straightforward	  coding	  of	  left-­‐right	  rotation	  
–	  and	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case	  whenever	  such	  analyses	  are	  performed	  on	  sets	  of	  
pictures	  of	  the	  same	  individual.	  However,	  later	  dimensions	  incorporate	  non-­‐rigid	  
transformations,	  seen	  for	  example	  in	  the	  expressive	  change	  visible	  in	  dimension	  
4.	  	  
	  
This	  example	  (figure	  9)	  is	  illustrative,	  and	  gives	  an	  indication	  of	  future	  work.	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  non-­‐trivial	  issues	  which	  will	  need	  to	  be	  addressed;	  for	  
example,	  how	  to	  quantify	  the	  extent	  of	  idiosyncratic	  variability	  in	  individuals’	  
faces,	  and	  how	  properly	  to	  sample	  images	  for	  statistical	  analysis.	  	  However,	  the	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main	  point	  here	  is	  that	  it	  is	  in	  principle	  possible	  to	  operationalize	  the	  concept	  of	  
within-­‐person	  variability.	  	  The	  eventual	  aim	  of	  this	  line	  of	  research	  is	  to	  establish	  
a	  representation	  of	  familiar	  faces	  analogous	  to	  a	  confidence	  interval	  for	  that	  
person.	  	  That	  is,	  we	  aim	  to	  establish	  what	  range	  of	  photos	  can	  be	  recognised	  as	  a	  
particular	  individual.	  	  Importantly,	  derivation	  of	  this	  ‘confidence	  interval’	  is	  
entirely	  statistical.	  	  	  Familiarity	  is	  not	  a	  binary	  dimension:	  we	  know	  some	  people	  
better	  than	  others,	  and	  we	  have	  a	  range	  of	  different	  types	  of	  exposure	  (for	  
example	  to	  celebrities,	  colleagues	  or	  family).	  	  These	  predict	  different	  
representations,	  depending	  on	  the	  particular	  sample	  of	  images	  to	  which	  one	  has	  
been	  exposed.	  	  This	  clearly	  has	  testable	  empirical	  implications,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  





I	  have	  argued	  that	  there	  are	  two	  serious	  problems	  with	  our	  current	  approach	  to	  
face	  recognition,	  as	  it	  applies	  to	  perception	  of	  identity.	  	  First,	  our	  experimental	  
methods	  do	  not	  acknowledge	  the	  inherent	  variability	  of	  different	  images	  of	  the	  
same	  face.	  	  Second,	  our	  theoretical	  approaches	  fail	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  major	  
differences	  between	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  face	  processing.	  These	  two	  
problems	  are	  not	  independent.	  	  With	  colleagues,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  unfamiliar	  
face	  recognition	  is,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  a	  problem	  of	  picture	  matching	  –	  because	  we	  
do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  information	  about	  how	  individual	  unfamiliar	  faces	  vary.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  do	  have	  access	  to	  variability	  in	  familiar	  faces	  (through	  
repeated	  exposure),	  and	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  this	  information	  is	  a	  key	  part	  of	  
familiar	  face	  recognition.	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  we	  are	  not	  arguing	  that	  variability	  is	  a	  
novel	  and	  neglected	  part	  of	  face	  recognition,	  whose	  study	  will	  add	  to	  our	  
knowledge	  in	  a	  cumulative	  way.	  	  Instead,	  we	  suggest	  that	  variability	  is	  a	  key	  part	  
of	  familiar	  face	  recognition	  –	  and	  without	  it,	  one	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  
the	  process	  at	  all.	  	  In	  fact,	  Bruce	  (1994)	  anticipated	  this	  argument	  many	  years	  
ago	  in	  this	  journal.	  She	  suggested	  that	  the	  non-­‐rigid	  motion	  of	  faces	  may	  make	  
them	  easier	  to	  recognise	  by	  comparison	  to	  objects	  without	  such	  variation	  –	  a	  
radical	  alternative	  to	  the	  view	  that	  familiar	  face	  recognition	  is	  so	  good	  because	  of	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specialized	  processing,	  innate	  or	  acquired.	  Unfortunately,	  this	  suggestion	  has	  not	  
been	  taken	  up	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  variability	  is	  not	  a	  
counsel	  of	  despair.	  	  There	  are	  well-­‐defined	  procedures	  for	  studying	  this	  directly.	  	  
Of	  course,	  no-­‐one	  would	  claim	  that	  specific	  techniques	  (PCA,	  ICA	  or	  related	  
procedures)	  are	  truly	  representative	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  human	  perceivers	  code	  
the	  range	  of	  images	  which	  can	  be	  recognized	  as	  a	  single	  person.	  	  These	  are	  
simple	  statistical	  tools	  to	  analyse	  images	  stored	  in	  particular	  ways	  on	  computers.	  	  
As	  the	  study	  of	  variability	  develops,	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  bring	  more	  
sophisticated	  approaches	  to	  modeling	  the	  statistics	  of	  images	  –	  almost	  certainly	  
incorporating	  more	  realistic	  constraints	  from	  low	  level	  vision.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  
statistical	  approaches	  themselves	  may	  need	  to	  be	  more	  sophisticated.	  	  For	  
example,	  it	  is	  surprising	  how	  much	  progress	  is	  possible	  using	  simple	  linear	  
techniques,	  but	  longer-­‐term	  these	  may	  need	  to	  be	  replaced	  with	  more	  complex	  
statistical	  analyses.	  	  However,	  despite	  all	  these	  caveats,	  the	  study	  of	  variability	  is	  
possible,	  as	  demonstrated	  above	  –	  and	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  also	  necessary.	  	  
	  
If	  variability	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  in	  face	  recognition,	  then	  some	  current	  
methodological	  approaches	  will	  also	  need	  to	  be	  abandoned.	  Where	  possible,	  it	  
will	  be	  necessary	  to	  use	  ambient	  images,	  i.e.	  the	  pictures	  of	  faces	  which	  people	  
normally	  recognize.	  	  It	  is	  tempting	  not	  to	  do	  this	  when	  testing	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  
particular	  independent	  variable	  on	  recognition,	  because	  it	  seems	  natural	  to	  
construct	  stimuli	  which	  vary	  only	  on	  that	  IV.	  	  However,	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  
eliminating	  natural	  variability	  may	  be	  misleading	  –	  at	  worst	  leading	  one	  to	  
believe	  that	  some	  dimension	  is	  important,	  when	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  only	  important	  
within	  an	  artificially-­‐constrained	  set	  of	  laboratory	  stimuli	  –	  perhaps	  only	  
detectable	  within	  such	  a	  set.	  Wherever	  possible,	  we	  therefore	  suggest	  that	  face	  
recognition	  researchers	  use	  naturally-­‐occurring	  stimuli.	  	  While	  this	  is	  difficult,	  it	  
can	  sometimes	  be	  more	  tractable	  than	  it	  first	  seems.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  
comparing	  familiar	  with	  unfamiliar	  faces,	  one	  might	  wish	  to	  control	  the	  two	  
groups	  of	  stimuli	  for	  certain	  visual	  properties.	  However,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  possible	  
to	  avoid	  this	  by	  using	  a	  two-­‐site	  design	  in	  which	  only	  local	  faces	  are	  familiar	  –	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hence	  eliminating	  the	  need	  for	  systematic	  matching	  of	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  
faces,	  since	  all	  faces	  can	  be	  used	  in	  familiar	  and	  unfamiliar	  conditions.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  I	  should	  reiterate	  that	  the	  criticisms	  leveled	  at	  face	  research	  in	  this	  paper	  
can	  all	  be	  applied	  to	  our	  own	  previous	  work.	  	  There	  is	  no	  intention	  here	  to	  be	  
critical	  of	  specific	  research	  programmes	  or	  (still	  less)	  research	  groups.	  Face	  
recognition	  is	  an	  exciting	  international	  research	  topic,	  and	  it	  has	  developed	  its	  
own	  vocabulary	  and	  practices,	  just	  as	  any	  other	  research	  area.	  	  However,	  I	  have	  
argued	  that	  it	  has	  developed	  some	  unhelpful	  shared	  assumptions.	  	  One	  of	  these	  is	  
the	  idea	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  face	  recognition	  is	  exclusively	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  
we	  tell	  each	  other	  apart.	  	  After	  all,	  many	  of	  us	  have	  pointed	  out	  to	  students	  that	  
faces	  are	  essentially	  all	  the	  same,	  and	  so	  recognition	  must	  somehow	  capture	  the	  
ways	  we	  are	  able	  to	  perceive	  rather	  subtle	  differences	  between	  people.	  I	  have	  
argued	  here	  that	  this	  way	  of	  conceiving	  the	  problem	  is	  not	  consistent	  with	  our	  
everyday	  experience	  of	  face	  recognition,	  which	  not	  only	  copes	  with	  variability,	  
but	  exploits	  it.	  	  ‘Telling	  people	  together’	  is	  a	  key	  component	  of	  telling	  them	  apart.	  
This	  paper	  calls	  for	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  face	  recognition;	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  
whether	  the	  research	  community	  finds	  the	  arguments	  it	  contains	  compelling.	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Figure	  2.	  Four	  pictures	  of	  the	  same	  person	  taken	  within	  minutes	  of	  each	  other.	  	  	  
Photos	  A	  and	  B	  were	  taken	  with	  one	  camera.	  	  Photos	  C	  and	  D	  were	  taken	  with	  a	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Figure	  3:	  After	  Harper	  &	  Latto	  (2001).	  Images	  of	  the	  same	  person	  taken	  at	  







	   	  
	   36




















Figure	  6.	  Examples	  of	  the	  1-­‐in-­‐10	  face	  matching	  arrays	  from	  Bruce	  et	  al	  (1999).	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Figure	  7:	  	  Rated	  attractiveness	  for	  unfamiliar	  female	  faces.	  	  Each	  column	  
represents	  a	  single	  person,	  and	  dots	  represent	  ratings	  to	  individual	  photos	  of	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Figure	  8:	  	  Average	  images	  and	  their	  constituent	  photographs	  for	  two	  people,	  RJ	  &	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Figure	  9:	  Shape	  components	  derived	  from	  a	  PCA	  on	  48	  photos	  of	  Harrison	  Ford.	  
Columns	  show	  the	  first	  five	  components	  (left	  to	  right),	  with	  values	  z	  =	  +	  1	  above,	  
and	  z	  =	  −1	  below.	  The	  average	  texture	  from	  the	  original	  photos	  has	  been	  mapped	  
to	  these	  shapes	  in	  each	  case.	  	  From	  Burton	  et	  al.,	  (2011)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
